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Abstract
Virginia is currently confronting a housing affordability crisis. Many municipalities across the
state are becoming progressively inaccessible to low-income Virginians. As this crisis continues
to escalate, Virginia localities and their communities are beginning to weigh their options to
address this problem. Relaxing zoning density policies to allow denser, multi-unit housing
construction is one proposed solution to increase municipalities’ housing stock and lower overall
housing costs. This paper addresses the following questions. How would the adoption of this
strategy affect the population composition of Virginia communities? Could these effects have
ramifications for Virginia’s political voting outcomes? Through fixed effects regression
analysis, this research finds that the effect of housing densification on increasing income and
racial diversity in counties is statistically significant, though substantively weak. Still, housing
densification’s role in affecting local political outcomes is amplified through its limited
relationship to racial diversity, with increases in multi-unit housing associated with the partial
closure of voting share margins between Democratic and Republican candidates in Senate and
Presidential elections. However, for this closure in voting margins to be substantial, Virginia
counties would have to see significant increases in their multi-unit housing stock, increases that
are historically rare or unheard of in Virginia. A closer look at an extreme case of multi-unit
housing growth in Falls Church, Virginia provides some insight as to what is perhaps inhibiting
the relationship between zoning, housing patterns, and expected demographic composition to
manifest: failure to accompany housing densification with active government controls on
housing affordability. Falls Church’s unique characteristics and extreme change in housing
patterns make generalizing this finding difficult. Further research is necessary to explore more
representative Virginia municipalities.

2

Acknowledgements
First, I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Manna. Thank you so much for your support
throughout this project and for constantly pushing me to reach higher. I can honestly say that
upon entering William & Mary, I never imagined myself doing research let alone submitting an
honors thesis. Your belief in me and my work have opened my eyes to a new world of things I
am capable of.
I would also like to thank Professors McGlennon and Stafford for being a part of my committee.
Given the intensity that is teaching and mentoring students during a pandemic, I am immensely
grateful for your time and input.
Next, I would like to acknowledge the groups and scholarships that have made this research
possible. Thank you to the McGlennon Scholarship and the members of the Government
department that selected my project among all the amazing submissions they received, I am
eternally grateful for and humbled by this incredible honor. Thank you to the Society of Political
Methodology who enabled me to enroll in the Inter-university Consortium for Political and
Social Research (ICPSR) Summer program, which gave me the methodological tools to conduct
my research. Your mentorship over the summer of 2020 was invaluable in giving me the
confidence to get started on this project. Finally, I would like to thank the Charles Center for
selecting me to be an Honors Fellow which gave me the resources and guidance to keep this
project moving forward.
Finally, I would like to thank my friends and family. An enormous thank you to my parents,
Maria Estrada and Felipe Hernandez, who sacrificed everything to give their children a better life
and continuously support me in everything I do. A special thank you to both of my brothers,
especially Ernesto who has been by my side providing me love and support throughout the entire
year. I would also especially like to acknowledge my roommate, Alison Reynolds. I would have
never gotten through this year without your care and lovely friendship.

3

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... 2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................. 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................................. 4
1. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 5
2. LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................................. 7
3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES ....................................................................................... 9
4. METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................................... 11
5. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................. 15

6. RESULTS FROM REGRESSION ANALYSES ............................................................ 21
6.1 Housing and Demographics ................................................................................... 21
6.2 Demographics and Voting Outcomes...................................................................... 25
7. DISCUSSION .................................................................................................................. 28
8. CASE STUDY ANALYSIS ............................................................................................. 30
8.1 Falls Church: An Overview.................................................................................... 30
8.2 Falls Church: What Happened and Analysis .......................................................... 35

9. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH .......................................................... 43
WORKS CITED ................................................................................................................... 46
APPENDICES ...................................................................................................................... 52
Appendix A.................................................................................................................. 52
Appendix B.................................................................................................................. 53

4

1. Introduction
The state of Virginia is confronting a housing affordability crisis. Five Virginia cities are
amongst the top ten in the country among eviction rates in 2016, and the state lacks 148,720
homes for extremely low-income renters. Amidst housing costs that are only increasing, many
Virginians are justifiably engaging in community conversations about who should bear the
burden of this crisis, or even if it should be addressed at all (NLIHC 2019; Gordon 2020). Many
proposed solutions center on relaxing low density or single-family zoning, namely zoning
policies in which a municipality dictates that most of its land will be occupied by housing
structures meant for one family alone rather than housing structures that can house multiple
families like apartments. By relaxing low-density zoning and allowing the construction of more
multi-unit homes, the belief is that the resulting increase in housing stock would help bring home
and rent costs down (Ivory and Colton 2020). What are the effects of relaxing zoning laws on
Virginia communities? Beyond possibly shaping communities, how could the adoption of this
strategy affect local political outcomes?
Considering Virginia has already and must continue to act on its affordability crisis for
the overall health of its economy and state citizens it is important to evaluate the possible effects
of the different strategies available. As housing is inherently intertwined with where people live,
the above questions are especially important because they strike at the core of local political
landscapes across the country: constructions of community. Inevitably, where one lives
determines who one is surrounded by and interacts with. These factors often shape culture,
education, and even political party affiliation or ideology. As Virginia tackles its housing
affordability crisis, likely with at least some municipalities adopting the relaxation of lowdensity zoning as a strategy, there might soon be a significant restructuring of several Virginia
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communities, which could have real political effects. In the United States, the importance of
zoning’s spatial construction of community is heightened by the fact that the lines demarking
electoral districts for local, state, and national elections are fundamentally tied to geography.
Further, within this larger discussion of housing affordability, this study helps address
Virginia’s problematic history with zoning. Zoning is infamous for its exclusionary nature in
segregating people by income and race, but there is limited research on how zoning can and has
shaped local politics by bringing about or shielding certain areas from demographic change
(Rothstein 2017). Research in this area is vital to not only to an understanding of present
solutions to housing affordability in Virginia but also to an understanding of how we can ground
these solutions within Virginia’s history and their implications outside of housing affordability
specifically.
Though this study is an important regional discussion for Virginia, it could also
contribute to wider national conversations. Zoning is a prevalent tool in land use management
across the country (Schuetz 2019). As the United States is experiencing both an increase in
income segregation and a persistence of racial segregation, it is critical that scholars look to
explore such possible sources like low density zoning (Fry and Taylor 2012; Williams and
Emamdjomeh 2018). It is all the more important to factor in political effects as systemic
injustices against racial minorities throughout the United States, particularly Black citizens, are
pervasive throughout American history. With historical phenomena such as literacy tests and
modern-day instances of gerrymandering, it is worth exploring how zoning could be or might be
another way through which localities may undermine minority voices in politics by spatially
segregating them from affluent, White citizens. Through addressing zoning’s effects on
communities in the context of housing affordability, particularly in the relaxation of zoning
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policies, this study can approach whether zoning today does have these effects and how they
might be undone.
2. Literature Review: The Relationship between Zoning and Population
Zoning ordinances serve the purpose of “segregat[ing] uses” for land (Lamar 2015).
Municipalities often employ zoning to designate certain areas for residential buildings or
commercial usage as well to regulate building codes and aesthetics. This study focuses primarily
on zoning to control residential areas.
Zoning arose in the United States during the early 20th century in the aftermath of
Reconstruction out of fear of racial integration and, more particularly, of “racial amalgamation”
(Hayward 2013). Initially, zoning ordinances were overt exclusions of Black citizens from White
spaces with different classifications identifying land meant for Black and White neighborhoods.
After 1926, counties eventually evolved their zoning strategy to Euclidean zoning, or the
modern-day version of zoning that marks areas for specific uses such as residential or
commercial zones (Rothstein 2017). Though these ordinances made no direct mention of race,
they continued the legacy of racial zoning through segregating citizens by income. Virginia
counties did this by instituting low density zoning and reducing the amount of affordable housing
available within their borders. During this time of transition to Euclidean zoning after 1926,
Black and other minority citizens confronted many challenges in acquiring wealth and were at a
significant economic disadvantage relative to White citizens (Schermerhorn 2019). Thus, zoning
that meant increases in housing costs like low-density zoning policies inherently meant racial
segregation.
However, though over 800 counties adopted zoning soon after 1926, zoning did not make
substantial headway into American cities until the early 1970s (Rothstein 2017; Fischel 2001).
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With the Fair Housing Act of 1968, which prohibited discrimination in housing policy, and the
rise of the interstate highway system, municipalities took it upon themselves to more strictly
regulate their land usage as a reaction to the possibility of demographic shuffling and to protect
housing value from arising industrial zones and developments (Fischel 2001). Since then, zoning
has become ubiquitous, with most cities and counties in the United States regulating their land
through zoning (Schuetz 2019). The origin of zoning and its prevalence today hints at a deep
interconnection between land use policy and the maintenance and shaping of local populations.
Therefore, the existence of evidence for the role of zoning policy in forging communities
as they are known today is unsurprising. For example, Rothwell and Massey (2010) sought to
account for the significant socioeconomic segregation that occurred in the United States after
1970. They find that there is a strong relationship between restrictive “density” zoning, or zoning
that controls how many units of residence a municipality permits on a given area of land, and
income segregation, or the spatial segregation of people defined by their economic class. More
specifically, they find that areas governed by more restrictive density zoning regulations, in that
they greatly limit the number of permissible residential units on their lands, have a population
that is more thoroughly segregated by class than do areas with more lenient density zoning
regulations. This connection between restrictive zoning ordinances and income segregation
seems intuitive. If fewer residential units, such as single-family homes, are the only ones a
municipality permits in residential zones, then it is likely that the cost of those homes would be
higher than smaller more dense housing units such as apartments on the same land assuming
basic similarities in quality. Setting aside the differences in housing unit size in accounting for
disparities in housing type prices, Adams et al. (2020) find that the limitation restrictive zoning
places on the housing supply itself greatly increases housing prices as well. Through this cost,
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zoning sorts people by what they can afford, restricting where low-income residents can live
while allowing high-income residents much freer choice.
As per the Fair Housing Act of 1968, these ordinances are strictly barred from overt
discrimination against protected classes such as racial and ethnic groups. In practice, however,
there is additional evidence in the literature that suggests zoning contributes to racial segregation
as well as income segregation. In another analysis of restrictive density zoning, Rothwell and
Massey (2009) find a strong correlation between restrictive anti-density zoning policies and
racial segregation, especially for Black residents. Through the mechanism of housing prices,
counties often have the incentive to employ anti-density zoning policies to keep land and home
values high. This results in a shortage of affordable housing available in an area, a shortage that
disproportionately affects racial minorities that are often low-income. In this way, zoning not
only discriminates by class but also helps lead to the construction of racially homogenous
communities. In more historical studies, Dubin (1993) and Nelson (1996) found similar results
consistent with Rothwell and Massey (2009), noting that higher cost housing segregates people
based on race.
3. Theory and Hypotheses: The Relationship between Zoning and Voting
Previous literature strongly shows that zoning, particularly density zoning ordinances,
play some role in segregating communities based on class and race. This is the mechanism by
which I theorize that restrictive zoning ordinances affect voting outcomes in multiple ways. First,
the spatial distribution of racial and income groups is likely to affect party voting outcomes.
With county-wide voting in presidential elections for example, a county might vote one way or
another depending on who is in it. If these areas are characterized by racial or income
homogeneity, as segregation would imply, there is an expectation that these areas will vote
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differently than areas with diversity based on race and class consciousnesses that influence
political party affiliation, ideology and participation. For example, Mangum (2013) finds
evidence for the relationship between racial identification and political party affiliation as well as
for political ideology. Morton, Tyran, and Wengstrom (2011) find evidence for the relationship
between income and party affiliation as well, with income capturing such factors as cognitive
ability, educational attainment, and certain personality traits.
Scholars disagree on how racial diversity comes to affect voting outcomes. Matsubayashi
and Rocha (2012) identify two ways in which racial diversity can influence electoral outcomes:
the policy backlash hypothesis and the electoral constraint hypothesis. According to the policy
backlash hypothesis, the presence of racial minorities, specifically Black citizens, “increases
antagonistic attitudes toward minorities among whites” (p. 602) and therefore results in more
conservative local decision making. On the other hand, the electoral constraint hypothesis
suggests that the presence of minorities increases the number of liberal supporters within a
municipality and can therefore result in liberal voting outcomes. Though Matsubayashi and
Rocha find that both hypotheses come into play in determining diversity’s role in shaping
electoral outcomes, many studies have found that racial diversity has more liberal effects on
voting outcomes. In their analysis of elections between 1940 and 1970, Calderon, Fouka, and
Tebellini (2019) found that counties that received Black migrants from the Great Migration led
to increased support for the Democratic Party in a time when backlash was likely to be more
prevalent.
In Virginia, I hypothesize that zoning affects county voting outcomes through the path
outlined in Figure 1. I believe less restrictive zoning leads to a county having more multi-unit
housing in addition to single family homes, the most prevalent type of housing in Virginia. These
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areas with more multi-unit housing will be characterized by a higher degree of racial and income
diversity than counties with more restrictive housing, namely with less multi-unit homes, by
offering a wider variety of housing. This difference in racial and income diversity results in

Figure 1. Path diagram representing the hypothesized relationship between zoning and
Democratic performance in Virginia elections.
different political outcomes between counties with different zoning strategies. Following the
electoral constraint hypothesis, in which racial and income diversity should lead to more liberal
outcomes, I hypothesize that the presence of racial and income diversity in less restrictive
counties will result in better Democratic candidate performances in electoral races relative to
those with more restrictiveness. As a result, relaxing restrictive zoning measures would
ultimately result in more diverse communities and more liberal voting outcomes.
4. Methodology
Despite evidence supporting the claim that modern day zoning affects voting through its
relationship with population composition in the literature, there are several limitations and
oppositions to this research. My aim with this study is to contribute to the ongoing debates on
zoning and political participation, while spotlighting regional effects of zoning particular to
Virginia. My research centers on a fixed effects analysis of Virginia counties from 2000 to 2019,
by focusing on changes in their voting patterns with respect to the evolution of their zoning
policies over time. Each of 133 Virginia counties and independent cities are represented once
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within four time periods, from 2000 to 2004, 2005 to 2009, 2010 to 2014, and 2015 to 2019, for
a total of 532 observations. These time periods are constructed primarily around the American
Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates for all Virginia counties (Social Explorer Tables).
There is no 5-year estimate for the time period between 2000 and 2004 so I constructed one
myself using regression estimation in a process outlined in Appendix B. Finally, I looked to
interpret my quantitative results through a case study analysis of one of Virginia’s municipalities,
the city of Falls Church.
Unfortunately, there is no extensive record of zoning plans over the past 20 years for all
Virginia counties. To track zoning restrictiveness then, I focused on housing structure records
kept by the U.S. Census and ACS. I used the 2000 Census as well as the 5-year ACS surveys
from 2005 to 2019 to obtain the proportion of multi-unit housing, defined as housing units
existing in structures with 10 or more housing units in total, among all other housing units
available as a proxy for measuring zoning restrictiveness. By definition, I take restrictiveness in a
county to mean that there is a smaller proportion of multi-unit housing available, something I
believe to be stipulated by county zoning policies. However, the actual number of multi-unit
housing units available, which is what I am capturing through this proxy, may differ somewhat
from written zoning plans. Still, measuring restrictiveness in this way allows for the analysis of
zoning’s actual effects as it would theoretically manifest itself if Virginia counties utilize it as a
method of addressing housing affordability: the actual construction of multi-unit buildings.
I then modeled the relationship between this multi-unit housing measure with racial and
income characteristics of each county, representing the left half of Figure 1, again pulling from
the US Census and 5-year ACS surveys. I had two dependent variables: a racial diversity index
and the Gini coefficient. I calculated racial diversity based on Simpson’s diversity index, a
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measure that captures both the number of different racial groups present in a county and the
proportion of residents that make up those groups (Kiernan 2020). The value ranges from 0 to
100, where 0 represents a complete lack of diversity in a county, where all residents are of one
race, and 100 represents infinite diversity, where there are an infinite number of racial groups
and members of those racial groups present. For income diversity, I use the Gini coefficient
which is another index ranging from 0 to 100 whereby 0 indicates perfect equality in which all
residents hold an equal share of county wealth and 100 indicates perfect inequality in which one
resident holds all of the county wealth (U.S. Census Bureau 2016). Since most Virginia counties
start off with single family homes as the most prevalent type of housing in 2000, I believe that an
introduction of multi-unit level housing will introduce lower income residents to a county and
thus increase the Gini coefficient, or income inequality.
I then tested the relationship between these population characteristics, racial diversity and
income inequality, with voting, to examine the right half of Figure 1. For this analysis I used two
dependent variables to measure voting outcomes: the share of votes for Democratic candidates in
presidential elections and the share of votes for Democratic candidates in Senate elections. I
looked at how counties voted from election to election, analyzing how the vote share going
toward Democratic candidates shifts from year to year (Chyzh and Urbatsch 2019). For this, I
combine the housing and demographics data provided by the US Census and ACS with MIT
Election Data and Science Lab’s County Presidential Election Returns 2000-2016 (2018) dataset
for presidential election results and Virginia’s Department of Elections’ 2000-2019 U.S. SenateAll General Elections (2020) dataset for Senate results.
Due to the division of the years 2000 to 2019 into four panels each representing 5-year
periods, the political data assigned to each panel of counties is based on what elections fall
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within those years. For the presidential elections, I assign the 2004 presidential election and the
2000 senatorial election to represent the time period 2000 to 2004. For the second time period
between 2005 and 2009, I utilize the 2008 presidential election and the average results of the
2006 and 2008 senatorial races. For the third between 2010 and 2014, I use the 2012 presidential
and senatorial elections and for the final time period from 2014 to 2019, I use the 2016
presidential election as well as the midpoint estimation of 2017 between the 2014 and 2018
senatorial elections. In 2002, the Democratic party did not run a candidate against Republican
incumbent Senator John Warner, so it is omitted from the voting outcomes.
As I conduct this two-part analysis, connecting multi-unit housing to racial and income
diversity and this diversity to Democratic performance, I will attempt to control for a few other
variables. For the first part between housing and diversity, I control for factors likely to draw
people into counties aside from multi-unit housing availability: employment opportunities,
education rates, and the proportion of senior citizens over the age of 65. Aside from housing
costs, people prioritize moving to where they can find employment that are safe and high-quality,
characteristics often associated with high local education rates (Carmichael 2017). For these two
factors, I use county unemployment rates to track employment opportunities and high school
educational rates for the population over 25 to track educational attainment. People also might
move to be with age in-groups or move to places that are senior age-friendly, something
especially relevant at retirement age (Frost 2020). To capture this, I factor in the proportion of
the county population that is over the age of 65 in my analysis. I use these same variables as
controls in the second part of my analysis as economic conditions such as employment,
education rates, and presence of a senior population all are factors that come into play in
determining political outcomes as well (Prysby and Scavo 2014). I also factor in religiosity using
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the number of congregations per 1000 people as a proxy since religiosity can also play a role in
determining voting outcomes outside of the spheres of race and income (Theiss-Morse et al.
2012). I pulled religiosity variables from the Association of Statisticians’ of American Religious
Bodies Religious Congregations and Membership Study, 2000 and Grammich et al’s (2018) U.S.
Religion Census: Religious Congregations and Membership Study, 2010 datasets.
Finally, I follow the quantitative results of these analyses with a deeper multimethod
qualitative look at Falls Church, VA. I traced the above theorized path diagram in Figure 1
through Falls Church’s zoning plans and its housing composition to its income and racial
diversity, with a special focus on racial diversity. I then tied that to Falls Church’s election
outcomes over the same time span. Falls Church is what Gerring (2008) would call an extreme
case. Falls Church is a small city in northern Virginia with one of the most drastic changes in
multi-unit housing over the past two decades. Its multi-housing unit stock grew by approximately
13 percentage points between 2000 and 2019, a growth that is almost five standard deviations
away from the average growth in multi-unit housing around 1.11 percentage points. It also is one
of the municipalities that needs to confront the housing affordability crisis the most, as it is
located within an area of high demand due to its proximity to Washington D.C. and its land area
covers only 2.046 square miles in total, so it is limited in its space for housing (Leslie 2020).
Though this case might not be especially generalizable to the rest of Virginia counties as a result
of these factors, the extremity in multi-unit housing growth in such a small space can still offer
some important insights into how multi-unit housing directly impacts communities and can affect
important demographic and political outcomes.
5. Background: A Look at Virginia Housing and Demographics
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Before considering results from the fixed-effects regressions, this section offers
additional context by exploring descriptive statistics for key variables in the analysis, starting
with housing. Virginia’s housing patterns have not changed much from the first time period of
analysis from 2000 to 2005 to the latest time period from 2014 to 2019. The majority of housing
units in the latest time period, approximately 75%, are located in single unit housing structures
like single family detached homes or single family attached homes. This number has stayed
pretty consistent throughout the past two decades, with Virginia single family housing hovering a
little above and below this 75%. Housing structures like duplexes, three-to-nine-unit buildings,
mobile homes, and other unconventional housing structures together make up around 17% of all
Virginia housing which has also remained fairly consistent. The focus of this research will lie
primarily with housing structures that contain ten or more housing units, like apartment
buildings. In this 20-year period, apartment building structures in Virginia have increased 1.15%
from making up 6.04% of housing units in 2000-2004 to 7.154% in 2015-2019.
Though these statistics are important to contextualize Virginia’s housing patterns overall,
it is important to note that they obscure the local changes happening within municipalities.
Figure 2 is the distribution of multi-unit housing composition for all Virginia counties across all
four time periods. Over 300 observations of Virginia counties over the course of 20 years have
had between 0-5% of its housing in multi-unit housing structures. For a vast majority of counties
across time, then, multi-unit housing supply has been very limited. The rest of the observations
still cluster around the smaller proportions of multi-unit housing. Only very few counties have
had their proportion of housing units in multi-unit housing structures exceed 30% in a time
period and only a handful reaching the 50-55% range.
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Figure 2. Distribution of the proportion of multi-unit housing across Virginia municipalities for
all time periods.
In terms of racial diversity, White and Black residents comprise the overwhelming
majority of Virginians. In the latest time period from 2015 to 2019, approximately 74.8% of
Virginia’s population was White and 18.6% Black according to the ACS estimates. Other racial
groups made up 6.6% of Virginia’s population. The White population was down in 2015 to 2019
from its 2000 to 2004 approximation of 76.5%, representing 1.7% decrease over the years. At the
state level, it appears that Virginia still has a vast White majority and is diversifying slowly.
However, this is not to say that Virginia has no diverse communities. On the contrary, Figure 3
depicts the distribution of the racial diversity index for Virginia municipalities across the four
time periods. Though a majority of Virginia counties have had racial diversity indices under 40,
indicating a low to middling level of racial diversity in many communities, 25% of the total
observations have a racial diversity index of 50 or more. This means that there have been at least
133 instances across time in which a Virginia county has had a fairly diverse community, despite
a minority population of non-White citizens in Virginia as a whole.
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Figure 3. Distribution of the racial diversity index across Virginia municipalities for all time
periods
Virginia’s average income inequality has increased from the first time period to the
fourth from 41 to 44. However, this preliminary figure hides a more diverse spread of Gini
coefficients across all Virginia counties during each time period revealed by Figure 4. Within
Virginia, the Gini coefficient has almost a 30-point range, moving between 33 to 60, revealing
that Virginia is a mosaic of different pictures of equality and inequality. Some counties like Bath
County in 2000 to 2004 with the minimum coefficient of 33.52, represent places that have low
degrees of income inequality between residents. In the context of this research, I take this to
mean that Bath County likely has little income diversity in which residents each have a similar
amount of income. On the other hand, Virginia also has localities like Dickenson County in the
2014 to 2019 time period that have held Gini coefficients as high as 60.02, which reflects a high
degree of inequality. This indicates that there is at least some degree of income variability
whereby there are some residents that hold relatively low amounts of income compared to
another group who holds a substantial amount more.
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Figure 4. The spread of the Gini coefficient across individual counties during all time periods.
As far as voting outcomes, Virginia has seen a great shift in the past 20 years. In the year
2000, George W. Bush, the Republican presidential candidate, won Virginia by getting 52.57%
of the vote over Al Gore’s 44.44% and in 2002 the Democratic Party did not run a candidate
against the Republican incumbent in a Senate election (Leip). After the 2002 senatorial election,
however, the Democratic party successfully gained ground in Virginia counties and started to
win elections. Though the Senate race in 2006 was quite close between Democrat Jim Webb and
Republican George Allen, with a margin of only 0.39% statewide, by 2008, this margin had
grown to over 30% between Democrat Mark Warner and Jim Gilmore with Warner winning 65%
of the vote (Clerk of the House 2020). In the 2012, 2014, and 2018 Senate elections, Democrats
continued to win with margins of 6%, 1%, and 16% respectively. Since George W. Bush’s
reelection in 2004, Democrats also saw gains in Virginia presidential elections, with the
Democratic candidates winning the state in 2008 with a margin of 6%, 2012 with a margin of
4%, and 2016 with a margin of 5%.
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In Figure 5, Democratic gains seem somewhat deflated with them only appearing to win
under 50% of the vote on average across Virginia counties in presidential elections and less
dramatic victories in the Senate as the margins in the overall state elections above imply.
However, this is an indication of how statewide gains mask a much different story at the
individual county level. At the county level, Democrats’ performance is much more varied, with
margins being much closer or even losing local polls overall. Figure 5 does not account for
population differences and treats counties equally in calculating average margins and thus it
reflects how Virginia elections for Democrats are likely carried by a few counties that vote
progressively, rather than a majority of counties overwhelmingly electing Democratic
candidates. Municipalities like Arlington and Alexandria, both of which have populations over
130,000 people, are consistently Democratic strongholds. Among other northern Virginia
municipalities, these areas are known to be the deciding factor for Virginia in favor of
Democratic candidates (Tavernise and Gebeloff 2019). With such fluctuations in marginal wins
in Senatorial elections and variability in margins at the county level in both presidential and
senatorial elections, it is extremely important to analyze the factors that could be making the
difference, including shifts in housing and population.
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Figure 5. Average share of votes for Democratic candidates in Virginia’s Presidential and
senatorial elections across all counties over time (n=532).
6.1 Results from Regression Analyses: Housing and Demographics
This next section considers the fixed effects regression models that the methodology
section described. Descriptive statistics for all variables are reported in Appendix A. The results
begin with models predicting county-level income inequality as measured by the Gini
coefficient. The key hypothesis in Figure 1, recall, is that increases in multi-unit housing in a
county’s housing stock will be associated with increases in income inequality. Table 1 represents
four models predicting housing patterns’ effects on distributions of wealth. More specifically, I
test the effects of a county’s proportion of housing units in housing structures with ten or more
units on a county’s Gini coefficient while also controlling for other factors that might affect
wealth distribution including the area’s unemployment rate; proportion of the population that has
graduated from high school; and the proportion of the senior population over the age of 65.
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Gini Index and Housing
(1)
Pooled OLS

(2)
Clustered
Standard Errors

(3)
Random Effects

(4)
Fixed Effects

10 or More
Housing Units

0.237**
(0.0217)

0.237**
(0.0104)

0.211**
(0.0320)

0.209**
(0.0827)

Unemployment
Rate

0.306**
(0.0586)

0.306**
(0.0663)

0.129**
(0.0493)

0.00169
(0.0517)

Education

-0.0628**
(0.0236)

-0.0628
(0.0285)

0.0280
(0.0246)

0.161**
(0.0339)

Senior
Population

0.366**
(0.0346)

0.366**
(0.0279)

0.371**
(0.0411)

0.194**
(0.0617)

Constant

38.39**
(2.083)
532
0.294
0.288
4
54.76

38.39**
(3.079)
532
0.294
0.288
2
.

32.14**
(1.834)
532

24.94**
(2.140)
532
0.787
0.713
4
31.87

N
R-Squared.
adj. R-Squared
df
F
chi2
sigma_u
rho
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ** p<0.01

4
150.2
2.651
0.566

Table 1. Four models tracking the relationship between housing, economic conditions,
education, and age of residents and income inequality.
Column 1 represents a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) model in which all county
observations across time are grouped together without factoring in individual county differences
or time effects in constructing the model. Column 2 represents a clustered standard errors model
in which I used OLS with regard to the different time periods but without factoring in individual
county differences. Column 3 represents a random effects model in which I account for both
individual county differences and time effects, but account for these effects in the model’s error
rather than in the actual model parameters. Finally, Column 4 represents a fixed effects model in
which I similarly account for both individual county differences and time effects but through the
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model’s constant, rather than in its error. Through F-tests and Lagrange Multiplier tests, I
determined that the OLS models in Columns 1 and 2 were not the best models to capture the data
generating process. Through Hausman tests, I found that the fixed effects model accounted for
individual county differences and time effects the best over random effects and all other models
(Park 2011). Additionally, the fixed effects model has the best fit accounting for 71.3% of the
variation in the Gini coefficient after adjustment. As a result, I will move forward with
describing only the fixed effects model results. In each iteration of testing beyond this dependent
variable of income wealth distribution, I continuously find that the fixed effects model suits the
data generating process the best. Thus, I will similarly discuss only the fixed effects results for
other sections of my results. However, I will continue to report the results of the other models.
Continuing with the results from Table 1, I find that my critical independent variable, the
proportion of housing units in a county that are located in housing structures with 10 or more
units, has a statistically significant relationship with the Gini coefficient at the 0.05 level. The
parameter estimate on the housing variable of .209 means that for every 1 percentage point
increase in multi-unit housing, there would be an increase of 0.209 in the Gini coefficient while
holding other variables constant. Other statistically significant variables include education levels
and proportion of the population that are over 65 years old. Ultimately, the statistical significance
of housing structure type, which does not even directly account for actual housing unit costs, is
worth noting. Depending on average changes at the county level in multi-unit housing, this
relationship has the potential to have impactful ramifications on the distribution of wealth in
counties and even on political outcomes.
Next, I move on to test my second hypothesis: increases in multi-unit housing are
associated with increases in racial diversity. I find that the relationship between racial diversity
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and housing patterns is somewhat larger than the one between income inequality and housing
patterns. As I did with my Gini coefficient analysis, I am basing myself on the fixed effects
model. There, I find that for a 1 percentage point increase in housing units in housing structures
with 10 or more units, the racial diversity index increases by 0.257 points, reported in Table 2
Column 4. The relationship is statistically significant at the 0.01 level. The model accounts for
98% of the variation in the racial diversity factor index of a county after adjustment. Other
factors like education, which may represent the quality or good standing of a locality, also has a
statistically significant result at the 0.01 level, but its effect is relatively small. With a 1
percentage point increase associated with only a 0.101-point increase in the racial diversity
index, the education variable’s magnitude is less than half that of multi-unit housing. Again,
similar to the case with the Gini coefficient, the statistical significance of the relationship
between housing pattern alone and racial diversity is noteworthy as it again does not directly
measure the affordability of such housing.
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Racial Diversity Index and Housing
(1)
Pooled OLS

(2)
Clustered
Standard Errors

(3)
Random Effects

(4)
Fixed Effects
0.257**
(0.0820)

10 or More
Housing Units

0.367**
(0.0928)

0.367**
(0.0251)

0.322**
(0.0741)

Unemployment
Rate

1.196**
(0.250)

1.196**
(0.269)

0.00152
(0.0520)

-0.00641
(0.0513)

Education

0.147
(0.101)

0.147
(0.106)

0.109**
(0.0334)

0.101**
(0.0336)

Senior
Population

-0.679**
(0.148)

-0.679**
(0.122)

0.0125
(0.0602)

0.0476
(0.0612)

Constant

22.34**
(8.895)

22.34*
(7.991)

21.72**
(2.509)

22.27**
(2.123)

532

532
0.986
0.981
4
11.29

N
532
532
R-squared
0.154
0.154
adj. R-squared
0.148
0.148
df
4
2
F
24.05
.
chi2
sigma_u
rho
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ** p<0.01

4
53.63
15.14
0.977

Table 2. Table of fixed effects model for racial diversity
6.2. Results from Regression Analyses: Demographics and Voting Outcomes
Now having looked at the relationship between housing patterns and county
demographics, I then turn to the relationship between these factors and voting outcomes. In the
models outlined in Table 3, I test the effects of income diversity, again represented by the Gini
coefficient, and racial diversity represented by the racial diversity index, on Democratic
performance in Senate elections measured by their share of votes. Column 1 is a fixed effects
model predicting Senate election outcomes without accounting for religiosity and with the full
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sample of observations. Column 3 is a fixed effects model that does account for religiosity, but
as a result is restricted to a subsample of observations. While religiosity may play a significant
role in determining political voting outcomes, specific, county level religion variables were only
available for Virginia counties at the exclusion of its independent cities. Thus, the model has a
much lower observation count, 408, than the other model that includes all counties and
independent cities, 532. Column 2 is a fixed effects model that does not account for religiosity
but also uses the limited sample of municipalities for which religiosity variables were available
in order to provide a comparison to Column 3.
Senate: Demographics and Democrats’ Share of Votes
(1)
Fixed Effects
Full Sample

(2)
Fixed Effects
Limited Sample

(3)
Fixed Effects
Limited Sample

Gini
Coefficient

-0.143
(0.148)

-0.0982
(0.161)

-0.0918
(0.162)

Racial Diversity
Index

0.422**
(0.148)

0.535**
(0.175)

0.535**
(0.175)

-0.0131
(0.150)

0.133
(0.210)

0.131
(0.210)

Education

0.0406
(0.101)

0.228*
(0.127)

0.222*
(0.128)

Senior Population

-0.851**
(0.181)

-1.381**
(0.227)

-1.393**
(0.229)

Unemployment
Rate

Congregations
Per 1000 people

0.353
(0.828)

Constant

36.45**
(9.849)
408
0.762
0.677
6
12.47

51.56**
36.86**
(7.652)
(9.790)
N
532
408
R-squared
0.793
0.762
adj. R-squared.
0.721
0.678
df
5
5
F
9.138
14.96
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table 3. Table of fixed effects models for share of Democrats’ votes in Senate elections
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Here I find that of the two key variables of analysis, only racial diversity is statistically
significant at least at a 0.05 level. The effect of racial diversity also seems to be strong in
magnitude in Column 1, with only a 1-point increase in diversity level necessary to increase the
share in votes for Democratic candidates in Senate elections by .422 percentage points. In the
Senate model accounting for religiosity, diversity’s role in share of votes for Democratic
candidates is even larger, whereby a 1 point increase in the diversity score is associated with a
0.535 percentage point increase in a Democrat’s share of votes. Column 2 corroborates this
parameter estimate for racial diversity despite not factoring in religiosity. Religiosity itself did
not really add much to model, but this may be due to the limited availability of observations
across the four time periods.
Table 4 represents similar analysis on presidential elections, where Column 1 is a model
using the full set of observations and Columns 2 and 3 operate on the subsample for which
religiosity variables are available. Again, only racial diversity appears to be the statistically
significant variable among those of interest. In Column 1, with the full set of observations, it is
significant at the 0.05 level. Under this model, racial diversity’s effects on the share in votes for
Democratic presidential candidates is weaker than in Senate elections, where an increase in the
diversity factor by 1 point is associated with a 0.279 percentage point increase in the Democratic
candidate’s performance. In the subsample models, racial diversity is statistically significant at
the .1 level. Here, its effect on Democratic voting outcomes is even weaker, with both models
finding that a 1-point increase in racial diversity is associated with an approximately 0.2
percentage point increase in a Democrat’s share in votes. In practice, these effects can be quite
large, as racial diversity varies widely across Virginia counties.
\
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Presidential: Demographics and Democrats’ Share of Votes
(1)
Fixed Effects
Full Sample

(2)
Fixed Effects
Limited Sample

Gini
Coefficient

-0.118
(0.105)

Racial Diversity
Index

0.279**
(0.105)

0.202*
(0.120)

0.204*
(0.118)

Unemployment
Rate

0.313**
(0.107)

0.785**
(0.144)

0.777**
(0.142)

Education
Senior Population

-0.0874
(0.111)

(3)
Fixed Effects
Limited Sample

-0.0987
(0.0717)

-0.0550
(0.0873)

-0.614**
(0.129)

-0.796**
(0.156)

Congregations
Per 1000 People

-0.0567
(0.110)

-0.0800
(0.0865)
-0.850**
(0.155)
1.689**
(0.559)

Constant

56.05**
(5.438)
N
532
R-squared
0.906
adj. R-squared
0.874
df.
5
F
17.13
Standard errors in parentheses * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ** p<0.01

51.70**
(6.713)
408
0.896
0.859
5
28.02

49.76**
(6.655)
408
0.899
0.863
6
25.50

Table 4. Table of fixed effects models for share of Democrats’ votes in Presidential elections.
7. Discussion of Results
Considering the weakness of income diversity in affecting voting outcomes, the majority
of the discussion here will focus on housing patterns, its relation to racial diversity, and thereby
its relation to voting outcomes. Beginning with the results I found in Table 2, I found that for a 1
percentage point increase in housing units in housing structures with 10 or more units, the racial
diversity factor increases by 0.257. In reality, this is quite a substantial jump in multi-unit
housing to make such a small difference. Supposing a county were to move from being at the
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25th percentile of multi-unit housing composition, which would be about 1.27%, to the 75th
percentile at 9.46%, that would be associated with only a 2.1-point increase in racial diversity. A
move from the 50th percentile, or 3.22%, to the 95th percentile, or 21.2%, would mean a bigger
increase in racial diversity by 4.6 points. When the average growth in multi-unit housing is only
by 1.11 percentage points across this 20-year time period, such growth in multi-unit housing
seems unlikely. However, with increases in multi-unit housing as high as 13 percentage points,
substantial changes similar to those described here are not unheard of. Calling back to the
original hypothesized path diagram in Figure 1, I find that the relationship between housing
patterns and racial diversity is present but fairly weak given actual rates of multi-unit housing
increases.
Following the path diagram, I find that due to the magnitude of racial diversity’s effect on
Democratic performance, even the relatively weak relationship between multi-unit housing and
racial diversity could be amplified in terms of its effect on voting outcomes. To reiterate, in the
fixed effects model for racial diversity, I find that a 1 percentage point increase in multi-unit
housing is associated with a .257-point increase in the racial diversity index. Using the most
conservative estimates of racial diversity’s effects on Senate voting outcomes, I still find that a 1point increase in the racial diversity index is associated with a .422 percentage point increase in a
Democratic candidate’s share of votes in Senate elections. For Senate elections in the latest time
period, the median margin of difference between Democratic and Republican performance in
county elections is approximately 11.5 percentage points favoring Republicans since most
counties tend to vote Republican despite the state overall tending to vote Democratic. Through
its association with racial diversity in Virginia communities, a 10.6-percentage point increase in
multi-unit housing could be associated with the closure of this gap by 1.15 points, or 10% of the
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total gap, going off of the estimates specified above. Through a 27-percentage point increase in
multi-unit housing, this gap could be closed by 2.875 points, or 25% of the total gap. Though
such growth in multi-unit housing is historically rare in Virginia, this is not to say it is
impossible. Considering many Virginia municipalities may soon need to significantly restructure
their housing in response to the housing affordability crisis, these increases could be more likely
in the future and affect voting outcomes in non-trivial ways.
Taking in the historical influence of zoning on racial and income diversity and Virginia’s
lack of significant housing restructure since initial zoning policies, it is still surprising to find that
the relaxation of such zoning policies in Virginia municipalities have not been associated with
more significant effects. The fact remains that there are still great disparities between White
people’s wealth and the wealth of others, with the typical White family holding 8 times the
wealth of a typical Black family (Bhutta et. al 2020). Further, Virginia’s high eviction rates are
highly associated with low-income, non-White residents (McCoy 2018). If relaxing zoning
restrictiveness is supposed to address housing affordability, why did I not observe a greater
association between more multi-unit homes and racial diversity? To answer this question, I now
turn to a deeper look into one Virginia municipality, Falls Church, VA.
8.1 Falls Church: An Overview

30

Figure 6. Street map of Falls Church City, VA with its location on the Virginia state map in the
upper right hand corner. Adapted from the City of Falls Church (2017).
The evolution of zoning and housing in Falls Church, VA, represents an extreme case of
multi-unit housing growth. Between the years 2000 and 2020, the City of Falls Church had one
of the largest increases in multi-unit housing among all of Virginia’s municipalities at a 12.8
percentage point increase. Although unusual for the state as a whole, Falls Church is still an
interesting and relevant study in that it is a small community with “little vacant land” remaining
in the city’s residential areas (City of Falls Church 2017). This lack of vacant space signifies that
the growth in multi-unit housing came at the cost of existing single-family or alternative homes,
rather than as a result of developing new land. Such a substantial change in such a small
landscape could reveal potential relationships between housing and demographics, as even the
smallest redevelopment could affect a large proportion of the city’s population.
Falls Church began the 2000s similarly to the wider Virginia area with a majority White
population and with a relatively uniform housing stock dominated by single family homes.
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Though its proximity to Washington, D.C. and the resulting unique economic and migration
factors related to that make conclusions gathered from analyzing Falls Church somewhat
limiting, it still allows for the basic analysis of what happens to a community when its homes go
from relatively sparse and spread out to a new, more densified pattern.
Figure 7 below depicts the demographic and housing changes in Falls Church over time.
In the first time period between 2000 and 2004, indicated by time period 1, Falls Church had a
racial diversity score of approximately 30, a Gini index of 39 and only 32% of its housing units
were in multi-unit structures. Moving beyond those time periods, both the racial diversity score
and Gini coefficient grew, with racial diversity growing more dramatically from 30 to 37 by the
third time period, or 2010 to 2014, than the Gini index, which only increased from 39 to 42. At
the same time, multi-unit housing also grew significantly over this time period overall,
specifically in moving between time periods 2 and 3, or from 2005 to 2014. In that time, multiunit housing grew to 42% of housing units overall. After that point, interestingly, racial diversity
and the Gini index diverge, with the Gini coefficient rising up to 44 and the racial diversity index
decreasing to 35. At the same time, the city still maintained its multi-housing growth but at a
slower pace, increasing only by 2 percentage points to 44%.
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Figure 7. Racial Diversity, income disparity, and multi-unit housing changes over time in Falls
Church, VA.
The quantitative analysis and this qualitative case study assume that zoning
restrictiveness and housing composition, namely proportion of multi-unit housing, are inherently
related. Falls Church provides evidence for the inter-connection between zoning itself and
housing composition and justifies looking at zoning more closely, as Figures 8 and 9 begin to
show. According to Figure 8, the City of Falls Church designated approximately 67% of its
buildings as single-family homes amongst all building types, including commercial buildings and
other types of alternative housing. Figure 8 also indicates that multi-unit buildings were in the
minority in 2005 among all building types at 8%. However, because Figure 8 represents
proportions of residential buildings amongst all building structures generally rather than housing
units, it is rather difficult to track onto the patterns identified in Figure 7. However, what we can
gather from Figure 8 is that according to 2005 zoning designations for Falls Church, the city
began the early 2000s with a zoning plan calling for a significant number of single-family
structures and a smaller minority of multi-family buildings. This does track with Figure 7
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estimates that Falls Church began in time periods 1 and 2 with a very low proportion of multihousing units.
Figure 9 is a much easier comparison to Figure 7 as it captures proportions of housing
units among housing structures. It represents planned zoning designations by residential housing
type at the tail end of 2009 into 2010 among residential buildings only. In Figure 7, under the
transition between time period 2 and 3, Falls Church begins to demonstrate a shift in its housing
composition from an overwhelming majority of single-family units to a more diverse housing
stock. Figure 9 reflects this change, as multi-unit housing represented over a quarter of total
housing in 2009. Generally, the City of Falls Church claims that their land use patterns and
zoning maps are “close to a mirror image” of each other (City of Falls Church 2017). Beyond
these two figures they consistently provide evidence to support this fact throughout time.

Figure 8. 2005 Falls Church zoning designating the number of residential building types as
percentages among all building types, including residential and business buildings. Adapted from
Northern Virginia Regional Commission (2004).
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Figure 9. 2015 Falls Church planned zoning designating proportions of multi-unit and singlefamily residential homes among residential homes only. Adapted from Northern Virginia
Regional Commission (2004).
Finally, Figure 10 captures the Falls Church political outcomes. From time period 1 to
time period 4, Democratic candidates gained significant ground. Though their performance in
Falls Church was strong to begin with, garnering approximately 65% of the vote in the first
period in the presidential election, Democrats still went from having a fair lead over Republicans
in the early 2000s, to dominating elections by the 2010s. However, this transition was not a
linear one for Falls Church, with Democrats performing better overall in elections during the
second time period’s elections than in the third time period when multi-unit housing was on the
rise. This evolution of Democrats’ performance in Falls Church does reflect a larger transition in
Virginia politics toward generally favoring Democratic candidates, especially considering that
Falls Church is among the populous northern Virginia counties that generally weigh elections in
Democrats' favor (Seabrook 2009). Considering the described patterns of drastic housing shift, it
is worth tracking whether this shift connects in some way to Falls Church’s voting outcomes.
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Figure 10. Democratic candidates’ performance in Senate and Presidential elections in Falls
Church across time measured by their share of total votes.
8.2. Falls Church: What Happened and Analysis
Overall, the statistics for Falls Church seem to reflect the results of the quantitative
analysis. Superficially, the densification, or increase in multi-family housing units, is associated
with an overall increase in racial and income diversity. During the same four time periods,
Democrats’ performance in Falls Church improved. However, it is quickly evident with Figures
7 and 10 that the story is much more complicated than that, as the growth in multi-unit housing
does not quite track with increases in racial diversity. For example, from time period 3 to 4,
where one would theoretically expect diversity growth after the substantial addition of multi-unit
homes that occurred in between time period 2 to 3, such a growth did not occur, and yet
Democratic performance continued to improve.
In Figure 10, growth in both racial diversity and multi-unit housing from time period 2 to
3 does technically track to better Democratic performance after the third time period, but the
magnitude of growth in Democratic performance across all four time periods greatly exceeds the
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smaller increase in racial diversity. Across the 20-year time span, Democrats’ Senate election
vote share increased by 10 percentage points in Falls Church. Falls Church’s racial diversity
index only increased in the city by approximately 5 points from 30 in the first time period to 35
in the last, meaning it should be associated with only a 2.1 percentage point increase in
Democratic candidates’ Senate election vote share based off of the results reported in Table 3.
This suggests that despite the quantitative findings that racial diversity is associated with better
Democratic performance, the magnitude of its relationship is not sufficient to account for such a
drastic improvement in Democratic performance in Falls Church. Ultimately, this confirms the
quantitative findings that the relationship between housing and demographics is a relatively weak
one and perhaps suggests that neither are central to changes in voting outcomes, at least for Falls
Church.
In the first time period, Falls Church residents who are White had a median income of
$90,085 and non-White Falls Church residents, weighted by racial group population, had a
median income of $59,879. This disparity did not disappear in the later time periods. From 2015
to 2019, White residents still had a median income over $67,000 greater than non-White
residents. With observed income disparities between White residents and other residents in the
area, why did changes in housing, namely densification, not lead to greater increases racial
diversity in Falls Church? Primarily, the answer lies in that housing densification in Falls Church
was not accompanied by increased housing affordability. In fact, according to the Falls Church’s
Consolidated Plan for FY 2011-2015, “there are very few affordable for-sale units in the City of
Falls Church.” This is true of 2004, before most of the multi-unit structure growth in Falls
Church, but affordability still did not happen after, as a 2019 report states that “Falls Church… is
experiencing rapidly rising housing costs” (Heffernan et al. 2019). The simple densification of
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housing in a municipality is not enough to account for changes in racial and income diversity, for
both of those to occur, there must be a more active municipal effort toward housing
affordability.
In its 2005 zoning plans, Falls Church stipulated that residential land use within the city
would remain fairly constant “with the exception of… medium- to high density development in
redevelopment projects” (City of Falls Church 2017). According to this plan, the city should
increase multi-unit residential housing buildings among all building types by 6 percentage points
from the 2005 levels shown Figure 8. With such increases in density in mind, Falls Church
moved forward and by 2015 had done much to accomplish its 2005 goals, with multi-unit
housing encompassing 26% of housing overall. However, the city failed to center affordability in
these plans. The 2007 City of Falls Church Affordable Housing Assessment Study found that the
City would lose up to 754 affordable multifamily rental housing units by 2010 through the
possible rehabilitation of affordable rental properties” (LaSalle 2007). According to its 2010
Housing plans for 2011-2015, this proved to be the case, as Falls Church’s “affordable for-sale
housing supply ha[d] significantly decreased since 2001” (Northern Virginia Regional
Commission 2004). In the present day, Falls Church continues to suffer a lack of affordable
housing as it confronts still more increases in housing costs (Heffernan et al. 2019).
Despite what these trends imply, the city did and still does have affordable housing
programming in place in addition to national programs like Section 8 vouchers. In 2002, Falls
Church introduced the Affordable Dwelling Unit (ADU) program through a zoning ordinance in
which the city offers density bonuses to developers in exchange for ensuring that a designated
proportion of the units they construct will maintain its price below market value for a period of
time. Developers of many types of buildings can take advantage of this program though many of
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them were multi-unit housing developers specifically. For example, Pearson Square, Northgate,
West Broad Residences, and Tinner Hill are all large multi-unit apartments under the ADU
program (Heffernan et al. 2019).
Notably, the ADU approach is primarily based in the city’s “dispersed” plan for
affordable housing in which affordable housing is scattered throughout the city rather than
concentrated in designated buildings. Prior to the surge in multi-unit structures in 2010, one
common comment from a Falls Church Community forum was along the lines of this one:
“many families of one particular race/income live in one specific apartment complex in the City
of Falls Church” (Northern Virginia Regional Commission 2004). This comment came from a
desire in the low-income community to have a wider availability of affordable housing beyond
just historically affordable sections. Concentration of affordable housing in only certain parts of
the city reduces choice for low income and often minority individuals deciding where to live. In
this sense, affordable housing in Falls Church through the dispersed approach should
theoretically make Falls Church a very attractive place to relocate for low-income individuals as
they have a wider variety of choices. However, since housing costs have only continued to
increase overall and income and racial diversity growth have stalled, programs and others like
these clearly did not have this effect.
It seems, then, that zoning had no real effect on the income or racial diversity that would
have occurred had low-income individuals entered the municipality. The reason is that in taking
this passive, density-bonus based dispersed approach, Falls Church failed to really produce the
affordable housing units many of its citizens demanded. In 2008, after the city had approved a
controversial affordable multi-unit housing structure, Councilman Hal Lippman spoke on the
insufficiency of the dispersed affordable housing approach: “the ‘dispersed approach’ to
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affordable housing, imbedding a small number in each new large-scale mixed use or residential
project, produced only 38 new affordable units in the City, despite the boom in such projects
since 2001” (Benton 2008). Lippman was not wrong. Most of these projects were luxury
apartment buildings that only served to increase rent prices and did not often take advantage of
the ADU program or other affordable housing initiatives (Sturtevant 2018). Overall gross median
rent in the city increased by approximately $800 in 2019 dollars from the first time period, 2000
to2004, to the fourth, 2014 to 2019 after accounting for inflation.
Superficially, one could interpret the controversy surrounding Falls Church’s 2008
approval of a multi-unit structure as the result of a deeply important tradeoff facing many
municipalities in confronting housing affordability through zoning: “the pressure for continued
economically-driven development, on the one hand, and the need for a serious consideration of
the affordable housing question on the other” (Benton 2008). However, community input on the
incident reveals that the conversation surrounding densifying the city, and more specifically
densification with affordability, also brought up questions on demographic change.
Starting in 2006, when conversations around the dispersed approach to affordable multiunit housing arose, it was clear who the main opponents to the concentrated approach were and
the Council, the decision-making body for Falls Church, knew it. “The Council knows that all
the heartburn it experienced over its differences with affordable housing advocates in the recent
past derived not from those advocates, but from the pressures of the wealthy residential
neighborhoods of this community against allowing affordable housing in” (Benton 2006).
Similarly, the Council was almost swayed in 2008 by calls for an “economically gated
community” on the grounds that the city of Falls Church “can’t be all things to all people” as it
narrowly voted 5-4 to approve the multi-unit affordable housing building (Benton 2008). With
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such fears of the introduction of low-income residents to the overall affluent, White Falls Church
community, dense housing construction went on, for the most part, without any active controls
on housing cost or pricing for residents. Since then, not much has changed in Falls Church in
terms of changing its affordable housing approach (Sturtevant 2018). Though densification
overall has not significantly increased the population of low-income residents, the 2008 incident
does point to a deep tie between densification and demographic change that local communities
factor in when discussing zoning and affordability policy.
Due to Falls Church’s continued dispersed approach and community fears, densification
is occurring in the area, but demographic change is slow. As a result, the voting outcomes
described in Figure 10 are likely not due to zoning’s effects on housing composition and racial
and income diversity. The urbanization of northern Virginia municipalities and increased levels
of education are likely spearheading Falls Church’s increased support for Democratic candidates
in recent years (Seabrook 2009; Tavernise and Gebeloff 2019). In Falls Church, specifically, it
seems that Falls Church affluent and educated suburbs within local townhome communities seem
to the greater source of votes for Democratic candidates in recent years, rather than the lower
income occupants of multi-unit housing (Bowman 2018).
All of this is not to say that Falls Church’s residential zones have nothing to do with its
demographic composition at all. Over the past 20 years, Falls Church has “seen a surge in
households that have incomes between $50,000 and $100,000 (Sturtevant 2018). It has also seen
a 5-point increase in its racial diversity index. Though Falls Church is diversifying rather slowly
compared to the surrounding areas, it is worth noting where this diversification is occurring.
Figure 11 presents three maps of the City of Falls Church depicting the municipality’s zoning
code in Figure 11A, its median household income levels by block group in Figure 11B, and the
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density of its White population by block group in Figure 11C. The areas in which the 2019
zoning map in Figure 11A specifies as higher density tracks quite well to areas that Figures 11B
and 11C point to where average income is lowest in the county and where White citizens live the
least. For example, the multi-unit housing buildings on Rowell Court, Hillier Street, and Rees
Place, identified in dark brown in the center of Figure 11A below, correspond to the lighter
shaded areas in 11B where Falls Church has a median income level between $50,000 and
$75,000. Additionally, these areas also have the lowest shares of White residents among the City,
being only 44-61% White according to 11C.

42

Figure 11. The Interconnection between Falls Church’s Zoning, Household Income Levels, and White Population

A. 2019 Falls Church Zoning map. Deep brown and black represent multi-unit housing (Community Planning 2019)

B. 2019 map of Falls Church depicting average household incomes
by block group. Deeper colors indicate higher income. (Statistical
Atlas 2019)

C. 2018 map of Falls Church depicting the proportion of White people
living in each block group in Falls Church, VA. (Statistical Atlas
2019)
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These maps still indicate that there is something deeper to zoning, housing patterns, and
demographics, despite findings that they are weakly associated. Coupled with Falls Church’s
community fears and its dispersed approach to affordable multi-unit housing, it seems that Falls
Church’s housing densification did not have my theorized substantial impact on diversity
indicated in Figure 1 as a result of Falls Church’s failure to accompany densification with more
active attempts at affordability than passive density bonus programs. This insight could help to
partially explain why my quantitative results did not reveal a strong association between the
relaxation of zoning restrictiveness and increases in diversity. Without local government controls
on affordability, increases in housing supply can only do so much in terms of bringing on
affordability itself, especially in areas like northern Virginia that have high demands for housing.
9. Conclusions and Further Research
My initial questions into this subject centered on zoning’s relevance as a possible
solution to Virginia’s housing affordability crisis. I sought to look at the past two decades of
zoning policy and housing composition to come up with ideas as to how zoning might come to
affect Virginia communities and politics in the future should densification become a dominant
strategy to address housing issues. Ultimately, zoning policy has substantial effects on
population composition and voting only if densification occurs on a massive scale currently rare
to Virginia counties, needing a growth of 10 to 27 percentage points to result in sufficient levels
of racial diversity to sway county-level Senate election results and even greater shifts to affect
presidential election tallies in the state’s counties. In a future where Virginia counties do
prioritize densification to address affordability, perhaps such effects are possible but considering
that median growth of multi-unit housing over the course of 2000-2019 was 0.48 percentage
points, this seems unlikely.
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Ultimately, my theorized path diagram outlined in Figure 1 did, in part, hold up in my
quantitative look at all Virginia municipalities but my in-depth discussion on Falls Church
revealed that is perhaps too simplistic. Relaxing zoning policies and ensuing housing
densification alone is not enough to yield substantial changes in population on a wider, more
systematic level at current Virginia levels of multi-unit housing. As a result, relaxing zoning
restrictiveness does not inherently cause demographic changes as they have emerged in the state
between 2000 and 2019 and thus, on its own, cannot help explain voting outcomes in meaningful
ways. Falls Church provides an excellent example of how densification policies do not result in
substantial demographic change. Tracing through its housing policies and programs suggests that
perhaps the reason densification did not result in demographic change within its borders was
because Falls Church failed to prioritize affordability in the construction of its multi-unit
buildings. The generalizability of this Falls Church’s specific story explaining the quantitative
results of this analysis is limited due to its extreme and unusual nature, more research is required
in order to determine if the failure to center affordability in the construction of multi-unit homes
weakens densification’s effects on local populations in Virginia generally and not just within
Falls Church.
These results still have important ramifications on overall discussions relating to zoning
and housing affordability. Previous literature discussions on zoning often take its effects on
demographics for granted. As noted in my discussions of the quantitative results, this research
reveals that zoning’s modern relationship to population composition is more complicated as
relaxing zoning density laws that have historically segregated communities by race and income
do not apparently do much to introduce income or racial diversity into Virginia’s municipalities.
Additionally, as many counties move forward with discussions of housing affordability, it is
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important to acknowledge that zoning densification and its increases in housing stock can only
do so much help lower housing costs, particularly in areas of such high demand like Falls
Church. As discussions on how to approach housing affordability continue, it would be prudent
for Virginia’s local governments to consider the effects of their strategies thoroughly.
Further research into zoning and demographics is still necessary. Primarily, it is worth
investigating what the interaction between densification and government controls on housing
affordability would lead to. If Falls Church, for example, had prioritized affordability in its
construction of multi-unit homes more, its story over the past 20 years might look a lot different.
It is apparent that zoning alone does not necessarily result in housing affordability in Virginia but
that perhaps it, in combination with other policies, could lead to a significant restructuring of the
state by providing more housing opportunities to low-income residents.
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Appendix A: General Variable Characteristics
Variable

Obs

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Gini Coefficient.

532

42.67281

4.335496

31.9

60.02

Racial Diversity|
Index

532

33.0221

16.91804

0.353825

60.87152

Proportion of Multi-...
Unit Housing

532

6.688817

8.728358

0

53.80688

Unemployment.
Rate

532

6.098201

2.881397

.2457002

Education

532

81.80567

7.758232

56.49253

98.88309

Senior Population .

532

16.28898

5.031888

4.714114

38.88385

Congregations per .
1000 people

408

2.118561

1.251296

.4291345

9.047824

.

44.0553

13.48529

14.43135

89.78502

.

48.74564

12.75828

22.07212

89.64226

.

Presidential Democratic 532
Share in Votes
Senate Democratic
Share in Votes

532

.
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Min.

Max.

.

33.5002

Appendix B: 2000-2004 Estimation
There is no 5-year American Community Survey (ACS) that I could use for the time
period between 2000 and 2004. Though the Census Bureau did at one point have this 5-year
survey, they have since archived it due to reported issues with the dataset. As a result, I created
my own 5-year dataset using the available ACS from 2005 to 2019 in addition to the 2000
Census. Using linear regression based on the available data, I estimated values for my variables
of interest for 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004. I then averaged the values for each year to create the
5-year period estimates for each county. The figures below represent the linear regressions for
five variables for five Virginia municipalities I selected at random using a random number
generator. As depicted in the figures, the linear estimations for the Gini coefficient, the White
population, the unemployed population, the senior population, and the high school educated
population do track well with the observed values in the available ACS estimates.
However, this estimation does incorporate error into my quantitative analysis. For each of
these variable estimations, I have at most four values to base the linear model off of: the values
inputted in the 2000 Census, the 2005 to 2009 ACS, the 2010 to 2014 ACS, and the 2015 to 2019
ACS. As a result, the real period estimates of an ACS survey that would have occurred between
2000 and 2004 might differ from the period values I created. This is especially problematic for
the Gini coefficient, in which I could only use three values to base the linear models off of
because the 2000 Census did not report county Gini coefficients. With more time, I would have
ideally used some version of multiple imputation, such as King et al. (2001) to incorporate a
more sophisticated estimation procedure.
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